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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Karsten appeals from the district court's order reducing her felony 
conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(3). On appeal, 
Karsten argues the district court erred when it did not set aside her guilty plea 
and dismiss her judgment of conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Karsten drove Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Schmitz to the hotel room of Mr. 
Weir, so they could collect a debt from Mr. Weir. (R., pp. 26-31.) She parked 
three blocks away and waited for them to return. (Id.) In Mr. Weir's hotel room, 
Mr. Ferguson pulled a gun and demanded Mr. Weir repay the debt. (Id.) Mr. 
Ferguson repeatedly punched Mr. Weir and threatened Mr. Weir with a knife and 
a set of homemade brass knuckles. (Id.) Mr. Ferguson instructed Mr. Schmitz to 
rip the phones out of the wall and take everything of value as a collateral. (Id.) 
They took Mr. Weir's cell phone and wallet. (Id.) Later, during police 
questioning, Karsten admitted that she knew she was driving Mr. Ferguson and 
Mr. Schmitz to collect a debt from Mr. Weir. (Id.) The state charged Karsten 
with Aiding and Abetting Robbery. (R., pp. 48-50.) 
Karsten pied guilty to an amended charge of Aiding and Abetting 
Aggravated Assault. (R., pp. 54-64, 67-69.) In October 2008, the district court 
entered judgment and sentenced Karsten to five years with three years fixed. 
(R., pp. 79-82.) The district court suspended the sentence and placed Karsten 
on probation for three years. (Id.) In November 2011, the deputy clerk reported 
1 
that Karsten had failed to pay the ordered fines and restitution. (R., p. 90.) The 
district court then entered an amended judgment, but did not make any findings 
that Karsten violated her probation. (R., pp. 91-95.) 
In February 2014, Karsten filed a Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea and 
Enter Dismissal Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. (R., pp. 98-100.) The state agreed 
that Karsten turned her life around and did not have any probation violations. 
(Tr., p. 3, Ls. 17-23.) However, the state argued that because Karsten's 
probation had expired, the district court could only grant relief under Idaho Code 
§ 19-2604(3) and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor. (Tr., p. 3, L. 
17 - p. 4, L. 5.) The district court agreed and held it could not set aside 
Karsten's conviction under I.C. § 19-2604(1 ), but could reduce Karsten's 
conviction to a misdemeanor under I.C. § 19-2604(3). (Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 
23.) The district court determined it was bound by the Idaho Supreme Court's 
interpretation of subsection (1) which only allowed relief if the motion was made 
while the defendant was still on probation. (Id. (citing State v. Guess, 154 Idaho 
521, 300 P. 3d 53 (2013).) 
THE COURT: Okay. Here's the problem. I have ruled on this issue. 
I hope I am wrong with my ruling. I'll say that to you. I said that 
when I made the ruling. I'll say it again and again and again. This is 
the most ludicrous statute that I've ever seen, but here's the 
problem. Earlier this last year the Idaho Supreme Court decided 
State versus Guess, and in a lengthy footnote Justice Eismann 
pointed out that the language of 19-2604 (1) seems to say on its 
face that when the legislature used the language "the Court may, if 
convinced by a showing made there is no longer cause for 
continuing the period of probation," that you have to make that 
motion before probation expires. Makes no sense to me 
whatsoever. Logically judicially, fairness, but that's the way -- that's 
what that Court said. It was dicta. I admit it's dicta. The supreme 
court has never ruled on it. I have issued two opinions from this 
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Court saying that if that's what the statute says, it's not my 
prerogative to amend it. I invited people to appeal. I invite you to 
appeal this case because I think the ruling I'm about to make 
makes no sense. But sometimes that's the way it goes. 
My interpretation is that probation has expired in this case; 
therefore, subsection (1) doesn't apply, subsection (3) does. State 
stipulated to a misdemeanor, I'll certainly grant that relief, but I can't 
grant the other relief. And again, please take this up. Can I say it 
any more forcefully? Because I think we need get an interpretation 
of the statute. It may very well be that there is a case, I think the 
public defender's office sometimes listens to me, sometime they 
don't. 
(Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 23.) The district court entered a written order, which 
stated, in part: 
Should the opinion of the court be overturned by subsequent 
appellate court decision or action of the Idaho Legislature, the 
defendant shall be allowed to motion the court for relief other than 
reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor without being prejudiced 
by the fact that the court granted partial relief through this order. 
(R., pp. 108-109.) Karsten timely appealed. (R., pp. 107-113.) After Karsten 
filed her appeal, Idaho Code § 19-2604 was amended effective July 1, 2014, 
pursuant to S.L. 2014 ch. 283 §1. 
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ISSUE 
Karsten states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to set aside 
Ms. Karsten's guilty plea and dismiss her judgment of conviction? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Karsten failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
applied Idaho Code § 19-2604 in accord with Idaho Supreme Court precedent? 
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ARGUMENT 
Karsten Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Karsten argues that the following language of the previous 
version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) is ambiguous: "if convinced by the showing 
made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it 
be compatible with the public interest. .. " (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Karsten 
argues the comma followed by the word "and" create two separate clauses that 
are applicable under two different circumstances. (Id.) The first clause is 
applicable when a defendant is on probation and the second is available to the 
defendant after probation has expired. (Id.) 
Karsten's appeal is moot because the legislature amended Idaho Code 
§19-2604(1) and the district court ruled that if the legislature amended § 19-
2604(1) it would entertain a second motion under Idaho Code § 19-2604. (R., 
pp. 108-109.) Karsten has potential relief available to her in the district court 
under the amended statute and this appeal will have no practical effect on the 
outcome. 
If the merits of Karsten's claim are reached, her interpretation is contrary 
to repeated and binding Idaho precedent interpreting Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ). 
See Guess, 154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56; State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 
335, 325 P.3d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 25, 319 
P.3d 1191, 1194 (2014). The Idaho appellate courts do not read the comma 
followed by an "and" to create two separate clauses. kl Instead, the Idaho 
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Appellate Courts repeatedly interpreted the previous version of Idaho Code § 19-
2604(1) to create four requirements that must be present for a defendant to be 
permitted to withdraw his or her guilty plea. kl Karsten's interpretation is 
contrary to established Idaho law and should be rejected. 
B. Standard Of Review 
It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to grant relief under 
Idaho Code§ 19-2604. See State v. Shock, 133 Idaho 753, 992 P.2d 202 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189,191,824 P.2d 120, 122 
(1992); Housley v. State. 119 Idaho 885, 887, 811 P.2d 495, 497 (Ct. App. 
1991 )). "When a trial court's discretionary decision in a criminal case is reviewed 
on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. 
(citing Statev. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
The question of statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the 
appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, _, 337 
P.3d 647, 651 (2014) (citing State v. Montgomery, 135 Idaho 348, 349-350, 17 
P.3d 292, 293-294 (2001 )). "Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, [the appellate court] must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction." kl (citing State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 
459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)). 
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C. Karsten's Appeal Is Moot 
Karsten's appeal is moot because after the district court entered it's order 
the legislature amended the very language in Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) under 
which the district court denied relief. The appellate courts can dismiss an appeal 
when the case involves only a moot question. State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 
170, 280 P.3d 195, 197 (Ct. App. 2012). "A case is moot if it presents no 
justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect 
upon the outcome." ]lt (quoting State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 
P.3d 382, 391 (2012)). "Actions which challenge the validity or the manner of 
implementation of a statute or regulation are often mooted because the provision 
has been repealed, amended or revised." Idaho Schools for Equal Educational 
Opportunity By and Through Eikum v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ. By and Through 
Mossman, 128 Idaho 276, 282, 912 P.2d 644, 650 (1996); see also Briggs v. 
Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 434, n. 5, 546 P.2d 382, 389, n. 
5 (1976); Cenarrusa v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 395, 396, 509 P.2d 1316, 1317 
(1973). 
Any decision on appeal will have no practical effect on the outcome of this 
case because the district court ruled that if Idaho Code § 19-2604 were 
amended the district court would entertain a second motion from Karsten for 
relief. (R., pp. 108-109.) 
Should the opinion of the court be overturned by subsequent 
appellate court decision or action of the Idaho Legislature, the 
defendant shall be allowed to motion the court for relief other than 
reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor without being prejudiced 
by the fact that the court granted partial relief through this order. 
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(ld.)(emphasis added.) The district court entered the order on March 11, 2014. 
(R., p. 107.) Idaho Code§ 19-2604 was amended effective July 1, 2014, 
pursuant to S.L. 2014 ch. 283 §1. Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) now states, in 
relevant part: 
the court, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer 
cause for continuing the period of probation should the defendant 
be on probation at the time of the application, and that there is 
good cause for granting the requested relief, may terminate the 
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the 
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the 
defendant. .. 
Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) (2014). Therefore, regardless of the ruling of this 
appellate court, Karsten is able to re-petition the district court for relief under the 
amended Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ). As a result, an appellate judicial 
determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome of this case. 
This appeal is therefore moot and none of the exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine apply. There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: 
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences 
imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged 
conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of 
repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns 
of substantial public interest. 
Long, 153 Idaho at 170, 280 P.3d at 197 (citing Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 
158, 163, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008)). There is no possibility of collateral legal 
consequences imposed on Karsten because she can re-petition the district court. 
The challenge to the statute is not capable of repetition because the statute has 
been amended. Finally there are no concerns of a substantial public interest 
because the statute has been amended and future challenges to Idaho Code § 
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19-2604 will be brought under the new version and not the old. There is no 
exception to the mootness doctrine and this court should dismiss this appeal and 
Karsten can seek her remedy in the district court. 
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse It's Discretion When It Denied Karsten's 
Motion To Set Aside Her Guilty Plea 
Karsten argues that the district court abused its discretion when it ruled 
that it did not have the discretion under the previous version of Idaho Code§ 19-
2604(1) to set aside her guilty plea because her probation had expired. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 1 Karsten's interpretation of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) is 
contrary to binding Idaho precedent. 
The version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) in effect when the district court 
ruled stated: 
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence 
has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon 
satisfactory showing that: 
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, 
in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant violated 
any of the terms or conditions of probation; or 
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and 
graduated from an authorized drug court program or mental health 
court program and during any period of probation that may have 
1 On appeal, Karsten does not challenge the analysis contained footnote three of 
Guess, which determined that the "continuing probation" language required the 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) motion be made before the period of probation has expired. 
(See Guess, 154 Idaho at 527, n.3, 300 P. 3d at 59, n.3.)) Since she did not 
raise the interpretation of this clause in her brief it should not be considered on 
appeal. See State v. Harris, 130 Idaho 444, 448, n.1, 942 P.2d 568, 572, n. 1 
(Ct. App. 1997) (Idaho Court of Appeal will not consider issue not raised in 
appellant's brief); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 
(1993) (Idaho Supreme Court will not consider an issue not raised in appellant's 
brief). 
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been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and 
the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding 
that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of 
probation; 
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no 
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be 
compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set 
aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally 
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant or may amend the 
judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state 
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the 
number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended 
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This 
shall apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted 
and granted probation by the court before this law goes into effect, 
as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final dismissal of the 
case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the 
defendant to his civil rights. 
I.C. § 19-2604(1 )(2013)(emphasis added). 
Karsten argues that the underlined language "sets forth two 
circumstances under which relief is available because the use of a comma 
before the word 'and' indicates that the two clauses function independently of 
each other. The first clause applies if the movant is currently on probation. The 
second clause applies if the movant's probation has expired." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 9.) Karsten's interpretation is contrary to Idaho Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting this statute. 
The Idaho Supreme Court explained that this statute creates four 
requirements that much be present in order for a defendant to be permitted to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea. 
In order for a defendant to be permitted to withdraw his or her guilty 
plea: (a) the defendant must have at all times complied with the 
terms and conditions of probation; (b) the court must be convinced, 
by the showing made, that there is no longer cause for continuing 
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the period of probation; (c) the court must find that such relief is 
compatible with the public interest; and (d) the court, in its 
discretion, must decide to grant such relief. Complying with the 
terms and conditions of probation is only one of the four 
requirements for obtaining relief under the statute 
Guess, 154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56. The Idaho appellate courts have 
reiterated this four part requirement. See Allen, 156 Idaho at 335, 325 P.3d at 
676; Glenn, 156 Idaho at 25, 319 P.3d at 1194. Karsten's interpretation of this 
version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) would create only three requirements. 
Under Karsten's interpretation, a movant would be subject to requirements (a) 
and (d) but only one of either (b) or (c). Karsten's brief ignores the cases 
interpreting Idaho Code § 19-2604(1 ). Karsten's interpretation is contrary to 
repeated and binding precedent. 
The district court did not err when it held it was bound by the terms of this 
statute. (Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 8, L. 23.). "A court does not have the inherent 
power to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea and have the 
charge dismissed upon successful completion of probation." Guess, 154 Idaho 
at 523-524, 300 P. 3d at 55-56 (citing State v. Funk, 123 Idaho 967, 969, 855 
P.2d 52, 54 (1993)). "The power of a court to permit a defendant to withdraw his 
or her guilty plea and have the charge dismissed is controlled by Idaho Code 
section 19-2604(1 )." JsL 154 Idaho at 524, 300 P. 3d at 56. The district court 
interpreted the applicable version of Idaho Code § 19-2604(1) and applied 
precedent. The district court did not err. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court dismiss this appeal as moot or 
in the alternative affirm the decision of the district court. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of January, 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
TST/pm 
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